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Life Expectancy and the Environment
* 
 
We present an OLG model in which life expectancy and environmental quality dynamics are 
jointly determined. Agents may invest in environmental care, depending on how much they 
expect to live. In turn, environmental conditions affect life expectancy. As a result, our model 
produces a positive correlation between longevity and environmental quality, both in the long-
run and along the transition path. Eventually, multiple equilibria may also arise: some 
countries might be caught in a low-life-expectancy / low-environmental-quality trap. This 
outcome is consistent with stylized facts relating life expectancy and environmental 
performance measures. We also discuss the welfare and policy implications of the 
intergenerational externalities generated by individual choices. Finally, we show that our 
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Environmental care betrays some concern for the future, be it one’s own or that of forthcoming
generations. Yet, the way people value future is crucially affected, among others, by their life
expectancy: a higher longevity makes people more sympathetic to future generations and/or
their future selves. Therefore, if someone expects to live longer, she should be willing to invest
more in environmental quality.
Of course, the causal link between life expectancy and environmental quality may also go the
other way around. Several studies in medicine and epidemiology, like Elo and Preston (1992),
Pope (2000), Pope et al. (2004) and Evans and Smith (2005), show that environmental quality
is a very important factor affecting health and morbidity: air and water pollution, depletion of
natural resources, soils deterioration and the like, are all capable of increasing human mortality
(thus reducing longevity).
Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that, as we will show extensively later on, life
expectancy is positively correlated across countries with environmental quality. In addition, the
data suggest the existence of "convergence clubs" in terms of both environmental performance
and longevity, with countries being concentrated around two levels of environmental quality
and life expectancy, respectively.
This paper provides a theoretical framework that allows us to reproduce the stylized facts
highlighted above. To do that, we model explicitly the two-way causality between the environ-
ment and longevity, which generates a positive dynamic correlation between the two variables.
This kind of interaction, which is central to our analysis, might in turn also justify the existence
of an environmental poverty trap, characterized by both bad environmental conditions and short
life expectancy. Moreover, we are able to identify inter-generational externalities, and study how
they might be corrected by policy intervention.
In the benchmark version of our model, we consider overlapping generations of three-period
lived agents, who get utility from consumption and environmental quality. During adulthood,
when all relevant decisions are taken, they can work and allocate their income between con-
sumption and investment in environmental maintenance: consumption involves deterioration
of the future quality of the environment (through pollution and/or resource depletion), while
maintenance helps to improve it. A key ingredient of our setting is that survival until the last
period is probabilistic, and depends on the inherited quality of the environment. In turn, this
survival probability affects the weight of future environmental quality in the agents’ utility func-
2tion. The idea that agents take utility from the future state of the environment is compatible with
both self-interest and altruism towards future generations.
It can be shown that optimal choices depend crucially on life expectancy: a higher probability
to be alive in the third period boosts investment in the environment and reduces consumption
(the latter translating into less environmental deterioration). Since longevity is in turn affected
by environmental conditions, the resulting two-sided feedback produces a positive correlation
between the two variables, both at the steady-state and along the transition path.
Depending on the shape of the survival probability function, our model can also allow for
multiple equilibria and may explain the existence of poverty traps: initial conditions do matter
and a given economy may be caught in a high-mortality/poor-environment trap. In particular,
we build an example based on a convex-concave function linking environmental quality and life
expectancy, which is backed up by some well-established scientiﬁc literature (see Cakmak et al.
(1999) and Scheffer et al. (2001)). Possible strategies to escape from the trap will be also identiﬁed
and discussed.
After analyzing the welfare and policy implications of our benchmark model, we introduce
human capital accumulation so as to deal with endogenous income dynamics. Parents can use
their income to also educate their children, while survival probabilities are affected by both envi-
ronmental quality and education. Considering human capital led growth, we are able to see that
the positive dynamic correlation between life expectancy and the environment still holds, and
extends to income in the long-run. However, we also ﬁnd that short-run deviations, which allow
the environment to worsen as income increases, are possible. Under proper conditions, we may
eventually end up with multiple development regimes, where the low-life-expectancy/poor-
environment trap is now characterized by low human capital as well.
Our model is primarily related to those papers that have analyzed environmental issues in a
dynamic OLG framework. Among them, John and Pecchenino (1994) deal with environmental
maintenance as an inter-generational problem, but life expectancy is assumed to be exogenous
and plays no role in their model. The idea of explaining environmental care with an uncertain
lifetime is instead present in Ono and Maeda (2001), although in their model environmental
quality does not affect longevity. On the contrary, Jouvet et al. (2007) consider the impact of
environmental quality on mortality, but neglect completely the role of life expectancy in deﬁning
environmental choices and leave no room for maintenance. Our model is also somewhat related
to Jouvet et al. (2000), who use inter-generational altruism to explain environmental choices.
3Let us also point out that, although environmental poverty traps have been already stud-
ied by John and Pecchenino (1994) and Ikefuji and Horii (2007), these papers overlook the role
of life expectancy, which in contrast we consider as being a crucial factor behind the existence
of multiple equilibria. In this respect, our paper is related to Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), or
Chakraborty (2004), in which life expectancy is regarded as a possible cause of underdevelop-
ment traps (although not linked to the environment).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts
on environmental quality and life expectancy that provide the motivation of our study. Section
3 introduces and solves the basic model, discussing its dynamic properties and welfare implica-
tions. An extended version of the model, allowing for human capital accumulation, is analyzed
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
Here we want to present the stylized facts that motivate our analysis and will be matched by the
main results of our theoretical model.
As a proxy for environmental quality, we use a newly available indicator: the Environmental
Performance Index (henceforth EPI). This synthetic indicator (YCELP, 2006) takes into account
both "environmental health", as deﬁned by child mortality, indoor air pollution, drinking water,
adequate sanitation and urban particulates, and "ecosystem vitality", which includes factors like
air quality, water and productive natural resources, biodiversity and sustainable energy. In the
end, the EPI is computed as a weighted average of 16 sub-indicators, each one converted to a
proximity-to-target measure with a theoretical range of 0 to 100. Therefore, the EPI itself can
ideally take values in the 0-100 range and, clearly enough, reducing pollution or preserving nat-
ural resources may both contribute to improve environmental quality. Using the EPI allows us to
avoid a myopic view of environmental quality, according to which environmental degradation
can be traced back only to industrial activity and pollution. In fact, poor environmental quality
can also be explained by factors like mismanagement of natural resources, deforestation, over-
grazing, unsanitary practices, etc.1 Since child mortality is, obviously, strongly correlated with
1Countries with a comparable EPI level may exhibit very different sub-indicators scores. Take for instance United
States, Russia and Brazil, that are ranked 28, 32 and 34 respectively, with an EPI ranging from 78.5 to 77. The United
States rank very high in environmental health, but very low in the management of natural resources. Russia displays
excellent resource indicators, while failing to achieve decent scores in sustainable energy. Finally, Brazil does well in
4life expectancy, in the rest of the paper we employ an amended version of the original EPI, which
is obtained removing the child mortality factor.2
Life expectancy is measured using "life expectancy at birth" (2005), from United Nations
(2007) data. Data on environmental quality and life expectancy are simultaneously available
for a sample of 132 countries; they allow us to observe a couple of stylized facts.
Stylized fact 1 Across countries, environmental quality is positively correlated with life expectancy.
As reported in Figure 1, for our cross-section of 132 countries there is strong evidence sup-
porting the idea that longevity and environmental quality are linked; in particular, the correla-
tion coefﬁcient is equal to 0.66 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The graph below is
compatible with the hypothesis of a two-way causality between the two variables.



























































































































































corr.coeff = = 0.66
Figure 1: Environmental quality and life expectancy
Sources: YCELP (2006), UN (2007)
In addition, a second kind of stylized fact is particularly interesting.
Stylized fact 2 Environmental quality and life expectancy are bimodally distributed across countries.
Therefore, the data suggest the possibility of an environmental poverty trap, characterized
also by short life expectancy. This concept points to the existence of "convergence clubs" in terms
water quality, but is characterized by extremely low biodiversity indicators. See YCELP (2006) for further examples.
2Child mortality accounted for 10.5% of the total EPI.
5of environmental performance and longevity: countries are concentrated around two levels of
the EPI and life expectancy. In fact Figure 2, depicting histograms and kernel density estimates

















































































Figure 2: Bimodal distribution of environmental quality and life expectancy
Sources: YCELP (2006), UN (2007)
Webelievethatthisdoublebimodalitycanbeinterpretedasatrap, sincethereisahighdegree
of overlap in the lower modes of the two distributions represented in Figure 2. For instance, out
of the 48 countries in the lower mode of the life expectancy distribution (less than 58 years), only
one shows up in the upper mode of the EPI distribution (EPI score larger than 62). Moreover, if
we divide both distributions into two groups of equal size, we ﬁnd that (i) out of 66 countries
with a EPI index lower than the median value (56.04), 54 also belong to the group characterized
by a life expectancy below the median (69.5), and (ii) out of the 66 countries with lower-than-
median life expectancy, 55 also exhibit a below-the-median value of the EPI.
Among "trapped" economies we ﬁnd, together with African countries, the vast majority of ex-
USSR republics. The low life expectancy in Africa has often been related to mismanagement of
3In both cases, the null hypothesis of unimodality is rejected by the Hartigan’s dip test, which measures the max-
imum difference, over all sample points, between the empirical distribution function, and the unimodal distribution
function that minimizes the maximum difference. Accordingly, we calculate the dip test statistic (d). For our EPI data,
the computed value of d is 0.0385. As it can be inferred from Hartigan and Hartigan (1985), in the case of our sam-
ple size (132 observations), the null hypothesis of unimodality is rejected because d > 0.0370 (at the 5% signiﬁcance
level). The same applies to life expectancy: on the basis of our data, since d = 0.036, the Hartigan’s dip test allows us
to reject the null hypothesis of unimodality at the 10% signiﬁcance level.
6environmental resources, pollution and anthropogenic climate change (see, among others, Patz
et al., 2005). The argument for a pollution-driven mortality resurgence has also been put forward
by McMichael et al. (2004) and, in the case of ex-USSR, by Feachem (1994) and Jedrychowski
(1995).
3 The benchmark model
We start by setting up a simple model where agents allocate their income between current con-
sumption and environmental maintenance. Consumption, generating pollution and/or increas-
ing pressure on natural resources, involves some degradation of environmental quality. No
growth mechanism is considered.
3.1 Structure of the model
We consider an inﬁnite-horizon economy that is populated by overlapping generations of agents
living for three periods: childhood, adulthood, and old age. Time is discrete and indexed by
t = 0,1,2,...,1. All decisions are taken in the adult period of life. Individuals live safely
through the ﬁrst two periods, while survival to the third period is subject to uncertainty. We
assume no population growth. Furthermore, agents are considered to be identical within each
generation, whose size is normalized to one (in the ﬁrst two periods). Preferences are represented
by a utility function Ut(ct,et+1), such that ¶Ut()=¶ct > 0, ¶Ut()=¶et+1 > 0, ¶2Ut()=¶c2
t < 0,
¶2Ut()=¶e2
t+1 < 0, limct!0 ¶Ut()=¶ct = +1, and limet+1!0 ¶Ut()=¶et+1 = +1. In particular, in
order to get closed-form solutions, we assume:
Ut(ct,et+1) = lnct + t lnet+1. (1)
People care about adult consumption (ct) and environmental quality when old (et+1);  > 0
represents the weight agents give to the future environment (green preferences), while t denotes
the survival probability, which is taken as given since it depends on inherited environmental
quality. Here, for the sake of simplicity, we abstract from time discounting so that the subjective
preference for the future is entirely determined by t. Notice also that, in our framework, an
increase (decrease) in the survival probability translates into a higher (lower) life expectancy, so
that hereafter we will use the two concepts interchangeably.
Let us underline that et may encompass both environmental conditions (quality of water, air
7and soils, etc.) and resources availability (biodiversity, forestry, ﬁsheries, etc.).4 Broadly speak-
ing, et can be seen as an index of the amenity (use and non-use) value of the environment.
Adult individuals face the following budget constraint:
wt = ct + mt; (2)
they allocate their income (wt) between consumption and environmental maintenance (mt). In
thisbenchmarkversionofourmodel, incomeisassumedtobeexogenous.5 Environmentalmain-
tenance summarizes all the actions that agents can take in order to preserve and improve envi-
ronmental conditions.
Following John and Pecchenino (1994), the law of motion of environmental quality is given
by the following expression:
et+1 = (1   )et +mt  ct   Qt, (3)
with ,, > 0 and 0 <  < 1.
The parameter  is the natural rate of deterioration of the environment,  represents the
effectiveness of maintenance, whereas  accounts for the degradation of the environment, or
pollution, due to each unit of consumption. The above formulation also allows for the possibility
of exogenous external effects on the environment: Qt > 0 (< 0) represents the total impact of a
harmful (beneﬁcial) activity.6
Notice that a reduction in ct has a double effect on the environment: it directly affects envi-
ronmental quality through  (alleviating the pressure on natural resources and/or reducing pol-
lution), and frees resources for maintenance (relaxing the budget constraint). Moreover, equation
(3) implies that agents cannot, through their actions, modify the current state of the environment
et: the latter is thus inherited, depending only on the past generation’s choices.7
4All these issues are taken into account by the EPI, that we have consistently used as a proxy of environmental
quality in Figures 1 and 2.
5This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4, where we allow for human capital accumulation and consequent
income dynamics.
6Natural disasters or episodes of acute pollution, like oil slicks or the Chernobyl accident, can be typical examples
of Qt > 0, while the implementation of an international agreement that promotes a worldwide reduction of pollutants
(i.e. the Kyoto Protocol) or the preservation of the Amazonian forest could be regarded as a negative Qt in our model.
7Therefore, our results would not change if we introduce current environmental quality et in the utility function.
83.2 Optimal choices
Taking as given wt, et and t, agents choose ct and mt so as to maximize Ut(ct,et+1) subject to (2),







Using equation (1), optimal choices are then given by:
mt =





(1   )et +wt   Qt
( +)(1 +t)
. (6)
Notice that here, given that agents are identical and the population is normalized to one,
aggregate variables are completely equivalent to individual ones. Therefore, all variables in our
model can be also easily interpreted as "country" variables.
From (5) and (6), we can observe that both consumption and environmental maintenance are
positively affected by income: richer economies are more likely to invest in environmental care.
In addition, current environmental quality has a positive effect on consumption, but a negative
one on maintenance: investments in maintenance are less needed if the inherited environment is
less degraded. These two results have already been established by John and Pecchenino (1994).
The novelty of our model is that we can identify a speciﬁc effect of life expectancy (as deter-
mined by the survival probability t) on environmental maintenance. As it can be easily seen




[(1   )et +wt   Qt]
( +)(1 +t)2 , (7)
which is positive for interior solutions, a higher survival probability induces more maintenance,
since it raises stronger concerns for the future state of the environment. This paves the way for a
positive correlation between longevity and environmental quality, along the transition path.
In addition, a relatively larger value of Qt requires more investment in maintenance. No-
tice that the term (1   )et   Qt represents the net effect of past and external environmental
conditions on optimal choices.
93.3 Dynamics
Once we substitute (5) and (6) into (3), we get the following dynamic difference equation, de-




[(1   )et +wt   Qt]. (8)
Sofarwehaveconsidered t asexogenous, althoughwehavepointedoutthatlifeexpectancy
may depend on (bequeathed) environmental quality. Now, we introduce explicitly a function
t = (et), such that ¶(et)=¶et > 0, limet! 0 (et) =  and limet!1 (et) = , with 0 <  <
 < 1. This formulation is consistent with a large body of medical and epidemiological literature
showing strong and clear effects of environmental conditions on adult mortality, like for instance
Elo and Preston (1992), Pope et al. (1995, 2004), Pope (2000) and Evans and Smith (2005). Such
effects are obtained after controlling for income and other socio-economic factors. The shape of
(et) may reﬂect "technological" factors affecting the transformation of environmental quality
into survival probability such as, for instance, medicine effectiveness.
Let us underline that agents cannot improve their own survival probability by investing in
maintenance. This is consistent with equation (3), where current environmental choices (espe-
cially mt) affect the future state of the environment. Any investment in maintenance will be
rewarded, in terms of environmental quality and life expectancy, only in the future period. This
introduces inter-generational externalities, whose consequences will be addressed in Subsection
3.6.




[(1   )et +wt   Qt]  (et), (9)
where, for the sake of simplicity, wt and Qt are assumed to be not only exogenous but also
constant, so that wt = w and Qt = Q.
This kind of dynamics results from the two-sided feedback between life expectancy and the
environment, described by mt = m(t) and t = (et), respectively. In this framework, a steady-
state equilibrium is deﬁned as a ﬁxed point e such that (e) = e, which is stable (unstable) if
0(e) < 1 (> 1).
Depending on the shape of the transition function (et), we may have different scenarios.
Figure 3 shows that we have only one stable steady-state as long as () is concave for all pos-
sible values of et. From equation (9) we can infer that the steady-state value of environmental
10quality e (and consequently life expectancy ) is positively affected by income w (through the
effectiveness of maintenance, ) and preferences for the environment (), while it is negatively








Non-ergodicity and multiple steady-states may instead occur if () displays one or more
inﬂection points, being for instance ﬁrst convex and then concave. In this case, depending on
initial conditions, an economy may end up with either high or low environmental quality: e
H
and e
L, respectively (see Figure 3).
A transition function(et) compatible with the existence of multiple equilibria might be gen-
erated by a variety of functional forms describing the survival probability (et). In particular, a
step-function approximation of a convex-concave (et) is convenient to get analytical results.8
In this case, a substantial improvement in the survival probability can be achieved only after a
given environmental threshold is attained. This is consistent with the idea that environmental
degradation may affect ecosystems, or human health, following a convex-concave relationship.
Dasgupta and Mäler (2003) explain that nature’s non-convexities are frequently the manifesta-
tion of feedback effects, which might in turn imply the existence of ecological thresholds and
multiple equilibria. Threshold-effects, non-smooth dynamics and regime shifts in ecosystems
8Notice that, however, the existence of multiple equilibria is not constrained by assuming a convex-concave (et).
Multiplicity of steady-state is also compatible, for instance, with a concave (et) of the type (et) = minf + Ae
t ,g,
with A > 0 and 0 <   1. We are thankful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.
11are indeed commonly assumed in natural sciences, as pointed out by Scheffer et al. (2001).9
3.4 An analytical illustration
The possibility of multiple equilibria implies the existence of an environmental poverty trap. To
give an analytical illustration of such a case, we introduce now the following speciﬁc functional





 if et < ˜ e
 if et  ˜ e
, (10)
where  > , and ˜ e is an exogenous threshold value of environmental quality, above (below)
which the value of the survival probability is high (low). The value of ˜ e may depend on factors
such as medicine effectiveness, health care quality, etc. For instance, a low ˜ e can be explained
by a very efﬁcient medical technology that makes long life expectancy possible even in a deteri-
orated environment. A high ˜ e might instead represent the case of a developing country, where
health services are so poorly performing that mortality remains high even under pretty good
environmental conditions.






1+[(1   )et +w   Q] if et < ˜ e

1+[(1   )et +w   Q] if et  ˜ e
. (11)
We can then claim the following:










then the dynamic equation (11) admits two stable steady-states e
L and e
H, such that e
L < ˜ e < e
H.
Proof. Provided that it exists, any steady-state is stable since 0(et) < 1, 8et > 0. Multiplicity
arises if [=(1 +)](w   Q) < ˜ e < [=(1 +)](w   Q), which yields the condi-
tion above.
9See also Baland and Platteau (1996), who state that, in the case of natural resources involving ecological processes,
there might well be threshold levels of exploitation beyond which the whole system moves in a discontinuous way
from one equilibrium to another. The existence of a threshold effect in the relation between air-pollution and mortality
has been also detected, for instance, by Cakmak et al. (1999).









(w   Q). (12)
As shown by Figure 4, the threshold value ˜ e identiﬁes a poverty trap: an economy starting
between 0 and ˜ e will reach the equilibrium point A, which is a steady-state characterized by both
low environmental quality (e
L) and short life expectancy (pinned down to ). In fact, a lower
survival probability induces agents to substitute environmental maintenance with consumption.
However, if initial conditions are such that e0  ˜ e, the economy will end up in the higher steady-











Figure 4: Environmental poverty trap
3.5 In and out of the trap
The very existence of an environmental trap implies that some countries (or regions) may expe-
rience, over time, both environmental degradation and decay in life expectancy. Cross-section
data would suggest that the latter is much less common than the former. Environmental degra-
dation might not imply lower longevity because economic growth (neglected until now in our
analysis) can harm the environment, but also generate additional income to increase (or pre-
serve) longevity. However, there is also evidence of countries where environmental degradation
is associated with a reduction in life expectancy. For instance, McMichael et al. (2004) iden-
13tify 40 countries that experienced a decrease in longevity between 1990 and 2001.10 They also
suggest that the resulting World divergence in terms of life expectancy might be explained by
"(the growing) health risks consequent on large-scale environmental changes caused by human
pressure". We can also mention the case - particularly cherished by economists - of Easter Island,
which serves as a good example of a closed system where insufﬁcient environmental care (or bet-
ter, too much pressure on natural resources) ultimately led to a dramatic reduction of the local
population (see Diamond (2005), or de la Croix and Dottori (2008)).
Let us now go back to our formal framework and assume that our economy is initially
trapped in the low steady-state (A, in Figure 4) characterized by (e
L,). We can identify three
different ways of escaping this trap: (i) a large enough permanent reduction in the threshold
value ˜ e, (ii) a parallel shift-up of the function(et), and (iii) an increase of the slope of(et). The
ﬁrst one, as already seen, might correspond to improvements in medicine.11 The second may
be induced by a permanent income expansion and/or reduction of harmful external effects.12.
The third one may be instead explained by a permanent rise of  that, similar to a reduction of
˜ e, can be traced back to technological progress in medical sciences, etc. Whatever the case, e
L
would be associated with a greater concern about the future, implying more maintenance, less
consumption, and ﬁnally convergence to the high (and now unique) steady-state B deﬁned by
(e
H,).
Intuitively, all the above channels may work in the opposite direction: a reduction in w
and/or an increase in Q may lead to the elimination of the high steady-state and an economy,
which would have otherwise ended up there, can be thrown back in the poverty trap. Even tem-
porary shocks (such as natural disasters or episodes of acute pollution) may be sufﬁcient to fall
in the trap. This raises a concern about the environmental awareness of countries. Neglecting
environmental care and a bad management of natural resources may make countries vulnerable
to even temporary events with serious long-lasting consequences for human development. Fur-
thermore, some countries might ﬁnd themselves trapped if they meet environmental constraints
when life expectancy is still low. This could be the case of those African countries that display a
10Most of them are African or ex-Soviet countries. Losses in longevity are sometimes severe, going up to 15-18
years, and "in several West African countries, (they) are not obviously attributable to HIV/AIDS".
11In de la Croix and Sommacal (2008), advances in medicine, through a longer life expectancy, promote capital
accumulation and growth. In our setting, they induce a different kind of investment, i.e. environmental maintenance.
12A possible real world example of a smaller Q could be the implementation of international agreements, such as
the Kyoto Protocol. Notice that even a temporary reduction in Q can help leaving the trap. In this case, however,
escaping from the trap does not imply the elimination of the lower steady-state.
14low life expectancy, but are already very polluted.
3.6 Welfare analysis
In our model, agents are outlived by the consequences of their environmental choices and are
not able to internalize the external effects of these choices on future generations. It would then
be interesting to compare such a decentralized equilibrium with a "green" golden rule allocation,
as deﬁned by Chichilnisky et al. (1995). This means solving the model from the point of view
of a social planner, whose objective is to maximize aggregate utility at the steady-state. The case
of a full-ﬂedged forward-looking planner, who also cares about generations along the transition
path and thus develops an optimal inter-temporal plan, will be analyzed in Appendix A.
As in John and Pecchenino (1994), we then look for the optimal steady-state combination of
consumption and environmental quality that maximizes U(c,e), subject to:
e = w   ( +)c   Q, (13)
which summarizes the budget and the environmental constraints, at the steady-state.
















Comparing (14) with (4) at the steady-state, we can see immediately that the golden rule
allocation does not coincide with the decentralized equilibrium, since (i)  < 1, and (ii) ¶=¶e 6=
0. In fact, as soon as there are intergenerational externalities linked to environmental quality (as
an argument of the utility function and as a factor affecting life expectancy), individual agents
consume more (and invest less in maintenance) than it would be socially optimal. We can then
claim the following:
Proposition 2 At the steady-state, a decentralized equilibrium involves lower environmental quality
than the green golden rule allocation.
The "distance" between the decentralized and the golden rule values of e is inversely related
to , while it is increasing in k¶=¶ek. At the limit, as  tends to 1 and ¶=¶e tends to 0, the effect
of environmental care on the future state of the environment and life expectancy vanishes, thus
eliminating inter-generational externalities. Therefore, the decentralized solution approaches the
golden rule allocation.
15In order to achieve an optimal allocation in the decentralized economy, environmental poli-
cies can be implemented. Consider for instance a tax levied on consumption, so that its price
becomes (1 +) (instead of 1): given the structure of our model, this boils down to taxing pol-
lution. Tax receipts will be then transferred in a lump-sum way to agents.13 If this is the case,
decentralized agents deﬁne their optimal choices according to:
¶U
¶c


















It can be noticed that the smaller the size of external effects, the lower the environmental tax.
In addition,  depends positively on  (which magniﬁes, through the pollution term in (3), the
intergenerational externality), and negatively on  (which, deﬁning the effectiveness of mainte-
nance, reduces the size of negative external effects).
In order to get some further insight, we specify the utility function as in (1) and the sur-
vival probability  as in (10), so that ¶=¶e = 0.14 We can accordingly determine the following
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Let us now describe the dynamics of the model, under the social planner and in the private
case, respectively. In Figure 5, we draw as a solid line the transition function for the decentralized
economy, while the dotted line represents the dynamic evolution of e under the social planner
hypothesis.
Depending on the value of ˜ e, we may have two different scenarios. If ˜ e is sufﬁciently larger
than e
L, as in Figure 5a, then there will also be two golden rule allocations, each one superior to
the corresponding competitive equilibrium. If instead ˜ e is close enough to e
L (˜ e0 in Figure 5b),
then there exists a unique green golden rule allocation; in this case we may say that the social
planner eliminates the lower steady-state, thus driving the economy out of the trap.15
13Our analysis would hold qualitatively unaffected, if taxes were used to subsidize maintenance.
14Therefore, one of the two externalities disappears and the tax rate in (16) simpliﬁes into = (1 )(+)=().
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Figure 5: The green golden rule
4 Introducing human capital accumulation
In the basic version of our model, income was completely exogenous in every period and we
did not allow for any growth mechanism. In this Section, we aim at overcoming this limitation
by introducing human capital accumulation through education. We want to capture three rather
simple ideas: (i) environmental preservation subtracts some resources not only from consump-
tion but also from investment, (ii) income growth, relaxing the budget constraint, makes more
maintenance possible, and (iii) growth might itself involve some pollution.16 A complementary
analysis, with investment concerning physical capital instead of human capital, will be devel-
oped in Appendix B.
Suppose to have, for instance, a low  and/or a high ˜ e in (10): in this case, although the planner’s optimality condition
(14) implies less consumption and more maintenance (with respect to the decentralized economy), this does not
necessarily translate into a higher survival probability (), at the steady-state.
16Ikefuji and Horii (2007) also have a model with poverty-environment traps related to human capital. However,
life expectancy plays no role in their framework. Moreover, since they do not allow for maintenance, they are not able
to consider a trade-off between investment and environmental preservation. Finally, in their model higher human
capital necessarily implies lower pollution, thus neglecting that growth itself is potentially polluting.
174.1 Structure of the model
Agents maximize the following utility function:
Ut(ct,ht+1,et+1) = lnct + t( lnht+1 + lnet+1), (18)
where, with respect to (1), we have introduced explicitly inter-generational altruism. Parents
care about the human capital level attained by their children (ht+1), and the importance attached
to this term is measured by  2 (0,1). Inter-generational altruism is eventually magniﬁed (re-
duced) by a higher (lower) t: the success (or failure) of their children will affect relatively more
those parents who will live long enough to witness it. Once more, for the sake of simplicity, we
neglect inter-temporal discounting, so that the preference for the future is completely deﬁned by
the survival probability. As it was in the basic model, an increased survival probability implies
also that agents put more value on future environmental quality.
The production of a homogeneous good takes place according to the following function:
yt = wht, (19)
where w, which we assume to stay constant over time, is both an index of productivity and the
wage rate; ht is also aggregate human capital, once we normalize to one the population of our
economy. As before, fertility is exogenous, constant and such that there is no population growth.
The budget constraint writes as:
wht = ct + mt + vt. (20)
Agents are paid w for each unit of human capital. Available income may be employed for three
alternativepurposes: currentconsumption(ct), environmentalmaintenance(mt)andeducational
investment (vt). More precisely, vt denotes the total amount of education bought by parents for
their children, assuming that education is privately funded.
Education is pursued by parents because it can be transformed into future human capital
according to the following function:
ht+1 = h
t( + vt)1 , (21)
where, depending on 2 (0,1), "nature" (parental human capital ht) complements "nurture" (vt)
in the accumulation of productive skills. Notice that  > 0 accounts for total factor productivity
in education, while the parameter  > 0 prevents human capital from being zero even if parents
do not invest in education, as in de la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004).
18Agents engage in maintenance because it helps to improve future environmental quality, ac-
cording to:
et+1 = (1   )et +mt  ct   yt. (22)
This formulation reproduces (3), with two exceptions: we have now added a factor accounting
for growth-induced pollution (through the coefﬁcient   > 0), while the term representing exter-
nal effects has been removed for ease of presentation. Since here, differently from the benchmark
model, we have introduced explicitly a production function, it seems reasonable to consider that
such production can also, to some extent, affect environmental conditions. Therefore, we have
now two potential sources of pollution: consumption and production. As in the real world,
both consumers and ﬁrms are susceptible to degrading the environment. We assume for the mo-
ment   < , thus implying that the environmental beneﬁt produced by one unit of maintenance
is larger than the environmental damage caused by one unit of production. This looks sensi-
ble, since maintenance is completely dedicated to improving the environment, while production
generates pollution only as a "by-product".
4.2 Optimal choices
Maximizing (18) subject to (20), (21), (22), ct > 0, mt > 0, et > 0 and ht > 0, leads to the following
optimal choices:
mt =
[ +( +)t]( + wht) + [ + ( +)(1  )] wht   (1   )[ +(1  )( +)t]et




f(1  )[(1   )et + (   )wht]  gt  




(1   )et + + (   )wht
( +)f1 + [(1  ) +]tg
. (25)
First of all, it is interesting to compare (23) with (5): the negative association between main-
tenance and current environmental quality still holds, as well as the positive effect of income,
which is now related to current human capital. All other things being equal, human capital accu-
mulation makes more income available for environmental care. Of course, investment in main-
tenance is negatively affected by, reﬂecting the relative substitutability between future human
capital and future environmental quality in the utility function. Finally, the positive effect of life
expectancy on environmental maintenance is conﬁrmed, provided that:
 > (1  ), (26)




[  (1  )][(1   )et + + (   )wht)]
( +)f1 + [(1  ) +]tg2 . (27)
Condition (26), which we assume to hold henceforth, requires that the preference for environ-
mental quality and the effectiveness of maintenance ( and , respectively) must be strong
enough to compensate for the weight attached to education (both in the utility function, through
, and in human capital formation, through (1  )), and the detrimental effect of consumption
on the environment ().
Parental investment in education depends positively on both human capital (because of the
traditional income effect and the inter-generational externality in education) and current envi-
ronmental quality. If the latter is good enough, requiring a smaller investment in maintenance, it
frees resources that can be allocated to education. Moreover, as expected, longer life expectancy
induces a stronger investment in human capital.17 In fact, provided that   < , the following




(1  )[(1   )et + + (   )wht)]
f1 + [(1  ) +]tg2 . (28)
Based on equations (27) and (28), a positive correlation between life expectancy and both
environmental quality and human capital arises, along the transition path.
4.3 Dynamics
By replacing (23)-(25) into (21) and (22), we get the following non-linear system of two difference
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[(1   )et + + (   )wht)]t
1 + [(1  ) +]t
 (ht,et). (30)
17This result, that we obtain for parentally-funded education, is quite common in the literature, although it may be
motivated by different reasons. For instance, Galor (2005, p. 231) claims that "... the rise in the expected length of the
productive life may have increased the potential rate of return to investments in children’s human capital, and thus
could have induced an increase in human capital formation ...". The positive effect of life expectancy on human capital
accumulation can be also generalized to self-funded education: since Ben Porath (1967), it has been well established
that the expectation of a longer productive life induces agents to invest more in their own human capital.
20Inthisset-up, asteady-stateequilibriumisdeﬁnedasaﬁxedpoint(h,e) suchthat(h,e) =
h and (h,e) = e. To build an analytical example, we assume, similar to Section 3, the fol-





 if et +ht < J
 if et +ht  J
, (31)
with, J > 0. This formulation captures the substitutability (accounted for by) between human
capitalandenvironmentalqualityinincreasinglifeexpectancy. Noticealsothat J isanexogenous
threshold value. In Section 3, we have explained how environmental conditions could improve
longevity. However, now we also assume that each agent’s probability of survival is positively
related to her own human capital. Such a mechanism has already been exploited, for instance,
by Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and de la Croix and Licandro (2007), in theoretical models
linking growth and demographic dynamics. Apart from an obvious income effect, the positive
inﬂuence of human capital on longevity may be justiﬁed by the fact that better educated people
have access to better information about health and are less likely to take up unhealthy behavior
(such as smoking, becoming overweight, etc.) This is also consistent with the ﬁndings of several
empirical studies like, for instance, Lleras-Muney (2005).
Equation (31) paves the way to the existence of multiple steady-states, i.e. multiple solutions
to the system composed by (29) and (30). After deﬁning the two loci HH  f(ht,et) : ht+1 = htg
and EE  f(ht,et) : et+1 = etg, we can claim the following:
Proposition 3 Provided that (i)   < , (ii) proper conditions on the threshold value J hold, and (iii) the
slope of HH is larger than the slope of EE, then there exist two stable steady-states A and B such that
0 < h
A < h
B and 0 < e
A < e
B.
Proof. See Appendix C
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1 (   )w](1  )g
, (33)
while, to obtain the low equilibrium (h
A,e
A), we just need to replace  with  in the above
expressions. Notice that w1=(1 ) < =(    ) is a sufﬁcient condition for both steady-state
values to be strictly positive.
21It can be shown that the steady-state values of both environmental quality and human capital
are positively affected by  and w, provided that   < . Concerning the other parameters, it
is interesting to underline that e depends positively on : the more important is nature (with
respect to nurture) in human capital formation, the more parents will be likely to invest in main-
tenance (rather than in education). Obviously,  and  also inﬂuence positively the long-run
levels of both human capital and environmental care. All these ﬁndings do not depend on the
multiplicity of equilibria, and would apply to the case of a unique steady-state as well.
Let us now give a quick description of the behavior of our dynamical system. An economy
starting from low (high) enough environmental quality and parental human capital, so that e0 +
h0 < J ( J), will end-up in the steady-state equilibrium A (B), which is characterized by both
low (high) environmental quality and human capital and short (longer) life expectancy. Such a








Figure 6: Phase diagram
Thecausalrelationshiplinkingthesurvivalprobabilitytobothenvironmentalqualityandhu-
man capital implies the possibility of a country being stuck in a poverty trap, as in the benchmark
model, and the underlying mechanism is quite similar. However, the trap is now characterized
by three elements, namely low levels of: (i) environmental quality, (ii) life expectancy, and (iii)
human capital.18 By consequence, differently from Section 3, an economy initially trapped in the
18This result is consistent with stylized facts, which suggest a bimodal distribution of human capital as well. Data
are available upon request.
22inferior steady-state can get out of it also through exogenous factors or policies that are related
to human capital. We may think of, amongst others, the introduction of public schooling or ed-
ucational subsidies, or an exogenous increase in the productivity of the schooling system (). In
Figure 6, the latter would correspond to a repositioning of the EE and HH loci, such that (h0,e0)
may fall in the basin of attraction of B instead of A.
Finally, we would emphasize that the dynamics represented in the above diagram are also
consistent with the so-called environmental Kuznets curve (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). An
economy starting with low human capital and a fairly good environmental quality, will ﬁrst
experience a deterioration of environmental conditions as it develops, but will then see its envi-
ronment improving for further stages of growth.
4.4 Welfare analysis
Here we want to ﬁnd the green golden rule allocation and compare it with the equilibrium of the
decentralized economy, where agents do not internalize the effects of their actions on the welfare
of following generations. We will proceed as we did in Section 3, by solving, at the steady-state,
the problem of a social planner who treats all generations symmetrically and strives to maximize
aggregate utility.
Therefore, we look for the optimal steady-state combination of consumption, environmental
quality and human capital that maximizes:
U(c,e,h) = lnc + (e)( lnh + lne), (34)
subject to:
wh = c + m + v, (35)
e = m  c   wh, (36)
and
h = h(v +)1 . (37)
Notice that (35) and (36) are, respectively, the budget and the environmental constraints at the
steady-state, while (37) is the stationary production function for human capital.
Eliminating m and v, and solving for c, we obtain:
c =





23After replacing c in the utility function, we can solve the system made of the two ﬁrst-order
conditions ¶U=¶e = 0 and ¶U=¶h = 0 to obtain:
eg =








 1   (   )w][1 + ( +)]
, (40)
where, consistently with our analytical example,  can be either  or . We are ensured that this
solution represents a maximum since: ¶2U=¶e2 < 0 and ¶2U=¶h2 < 0. After comparing eg with
e, we can claim the following:
Proposition 4 At the steady-state, for sufﬁciently low values of , the decentralized equilibrium involves
lower environmental quality than the green golden rule allocation. Moreover, under proper conditions, the
social planner solution may imply the elimination of the environmental trap.
In particular, we need  < ˆ , where:
ˆ  
 + [  
1
1 (   )w](1  )
(1 +)
. (41)
Provided that the conditions mentioned in Proposition 3 hold, ˆ  is positive. In addition, for 
tending to 0, ˆ  tends to 1, thus reproducing the case analyzed in Section 3. This is not surprising,
since represents the weight of human capital in the utility function.
Moreover, depending on how close the decentralized low steady-state is to J, there is the pos-
sibility that the golden rule allocation is unique. In other words, a social planner who internalizes
inter-generational externalities might be able to drive the economy out of the trap.
Finally, let us point out that the socially optimal allocation can be decentralized by means of
suitable tax/subsidy policies of the kind we have studied in Section 3. The main ﬁndings (in
terms, for instance, of optimal environmental taxation) would not be different from the bench-
mark model. However, since further sources of externalities (related to human capital) are now
present, additional instruments would be needed.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the interplay between life expectancy and the environment, and
the resulting dynamic implications. The basic mechanism, upon which our theoretical model is
24built, is very simple. On the one hand, environmental quality depends on life expectancy, since
agents who expect to live longer have a stronger concern for the future and therefore invest more
in environmental care. On the other hand, longevity is affected by environmental conditions. By
modeling environmental quality as an asset that can be accumulated over time, we have shown
that life expectancy and environmental dynamics can be jointly determined. Eventually, multiple
equilibria may arise, deﬁning an environmental kind of poverty trap characterized by both low
life expectancy and poor environmental performance. Both the correlation between environment
and longevity, and possible non-ergodic dynamics, are consistent with stylized facts.
Our model is also robust to the introduction of a very simple growth mechanism via human
capital accumulation. If education depends on life expectancy, and survival probabilities are
affected by both environmental quality and human capital, we show that the positive dynamic
correlation between longevity and environmental quality is preserved, and extends to income
(in the long-run).
Moreover, our welfare analysis suggests that decentralized equilibria are inefﬁcient. Agents
do not internalize the effects of their choices on future generations. A social planner who takes
these inter-generational externalities into account might achieve a superior equilibrium. We also
show that the optimal allocation can be decentralized by means of appropriate environmental
policies.
Finally, as interesting extensions and possible directions for further research, we would sug-
gest: (i) to introduce heterogeneity among agents, moving from a representative agent set-up to
a political economy model, where environmental choices are determined through voting; (ii) to
enhance the demographic part of the model, allowing for endogenous fertility and relating envi-
ronmental quality to demographic factors other than longevity (population density, for instance);
(iii) to explore alternative policy options suitable for restoring optimality.
Appendices
A Optimality of the dynamics
Let us now consider a full-ﬂedged, forward-looking social planner, who seeks to maximize a
social welfare function including all generations (both at the steady-state and along the transition
25path). The Lagrangian for this problem is:




t fUt(ct,et+1) + t+1[(1   )et +w   ( +)ct   et+1]g, (A.1)
where t+1 is the Lagrangian multiplier, corresponding to the shadow price of environmental
quality and  2 (0,1) accounts for inter-temporal discounting. From the two f.o.c.’s (¶L=¶ct = 0















Comparing the above expression with (4), we see that for the decentralized equilibrium to be





+ t+2(1   ) = 0, (A.3)
which never holds, unless ¶t+1=¶et+1 = 0 and  = 1. Equation (A.3) allows us to identify two
different inter-generational externalities, both related to mt. The ﬁrst term accounts for the effect
of maintenance on the survival probability of future generations; the second one is due to the
direct effect of maintenance on future environmental quality.
As in Section 3, inefﬁciencies can be corrected by means of environmental taxes. Since both
externalities are related to the same source (maintenance), it turns out that one policy instrument
is sufﬁcient to achieve optimality. If t is the tax rate on consumption at time t, decentralized
agents allocate their resources according to:
¶Ut
¶ct


















externaleffects, ¶t+1=¶et+1 and(1 ), respectively. Concerningtheotherparameters, itshould
be noticed that a higher, implying a greater concern for future generations, requires the tax rate
to be heavier, while the effect of  and is as in Subsection 3.6.
26B Physical capital
Here, we want to show that our benchmark model is robust to the introduction of physical cap-
ital. Since the latter is built on savings, the optimization problem of our representative agent
needs to be modiﬁed. The utility function is now:
Ut(ct,ct+1,et+1) = lnct + t(lnct+1 + lnet+1), (A.6)
where  2 (0,1), which might be eventually set equal to (1   ), measures the preference for
future consumption. The ﬁrst-period budget constraint becomes:
wt = ct + mt + st, (A.7)






where Rt+1 denotes the interest factor at time t + 1. As pointed out by Chakraborty (2004), the
above expression is also consistent with the assumption of a perfect annuity market, and takes
into account that agents are not sure to survive to their third period of life. In fact, they are
perfectly aware that only with a probability t, they will be able to enjoy their current savings as
future consumption.
To determine the factor prices wt and Rt+1, we can introduce a neo-classical production func-
tion that, in per-capita terms, can be simply written as yt = f(kt).
Investment is made out of savings; the law of motion for the stock of physical capital writes
as:
kt+1 = (1  )kt + st, (A.9)
where 2 (0,1] is the depreciation rate of capital.
The dynamics of environmental quality are described by:
et+1 = (1   )et +mt  ct  kt, (A.10)
with  > 0. With respect to equation (3), we have added the kt term to take into account that
also the use of capital in production, and not only consumption, is potentially polluting.
In this economy, individual agents select mt and st (and implicitly deﬁne an optimal inter-
temporal consumption plan), so as to maximizeUt(ct,ct+1,et+1) subject to (A.7), (A.8) and (A.10).









along with (4). If we take the logarithmic utility function (A.6) and use (A.8), we obtain:
st = et+1. (A.12)
Abstracting from corner solutions, optimal choices are thus given by:
mt =
[kt   (1   )et][ +( +)t] +[ +( +)t]wt
( +)[1 + ( +)t]
, (A.13)
st =
t[(1   )et  kt +wt]




(1   )et  kt +wt
( +)[1 + ( +)t]
. (A.15)
It can be noticed that investments in environmental care mt depend positively on the existing
stock of physical capital, through two different channels: the ﬁrst one is related to more pollution
(kt) requiring more maintenance, while the second one accounts for a straightforward income
effect (since wt = w(kt)). Conversely, investment in physical capital (savings) is an increasing
function of environmental quality, due to a substitution effect: a healthier environment needs
less maintenance, thus freeing resources for alternative purposes.
In the long-run, this kind of interplay translates into a positive correlation between the sta-
tionary values of capital and environmental quality. In fact, combining (A.9) and (A.12), we
obtain k = e. It is then clear that, for instance, as soon as multiple equilibria become pos-
sible (depending on the shape of (et)), the corresponding poverty trap will be characterized by
low levels of life expectancy and both environmental quality and physical capital.
Once we replace optimal choices (A.13), (A.14) and (A.15) into (A.9) and (A.10), and consider
that wt = f(kt) ktf 0(kt), we can compute the steady-state values for environmental quality and
physical capital. Take for instance a Cobb-Douglas production function, such that yt = Bk

t (with
 2 (0,1) and B > 0), and assume a survival probability function as in (10). The steady-state








The stationary value(s) for environmental quality can be accordingly determined, using e =
(=)k.
28C Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is organized as follows. We will ﬁrst characterize the two loci HH and EE, and then
analyze the existence, multiplicity and stability of the steady-states. Let us now recall the deﬁni-
tions of the two loci: HH  f(ht,et) : ht+1 = htg and EE  f(ht,et) : et+1 = etg.
C.1 Locus HH
From equation (29) we get that ht+1   ht = (ht,et)   ht, where t is given by equation (31).
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where t =  (= ) for et +ht < J ( J). As we can see in Figure 6, locus HH is a discontinuous
function divided into two parts (both straight lines) by et = J  ht. Its intersection with the y-




f1 + [(1  ) +]tg  (1  )(   )wt
1
1 




where t =  (= ) for et +ht < J ( J). Indeed, as it is clear from the above equation, for
sh to be positive, we just need to have a positive numerator. Moreover, one can also verify that
¶sh()=¶ < 0. This implies that the ﬁrst portion of the locus HH (given by sh()) is steeper
than the second one (sh()), as depicted in Figure 6.
C.2 Locus EE
Equation (30) yields et+1   et = (ht,et)   et, where t is given by equation (31). Therefore, the
locus EE can be written as:
et =  
t
(1   )t   f1 + [(1  ) +]tg
 
(   )wt
(1   )t   f1 + [(1  ) +]tg
ht, (A.19)
where t =  (= ) for et +ht < J ( J). Like HH, the locus EE is also a discontinuous function
divided in two different parts (once more straight lines) by et = J  ht. Moreover:
etEE jht=0 =  
t
(1   )t   f1 + [(1  ) +]tg
,





(1   )t   f1 + [(1  ) +]tg
 se(t), (A.20)
29where, as usual, t =  (= ) for et +ht < J ( J). One can easily observe that the denominator
of the previous equation is strictly negative. Therefore, etEE jht=0 > 0 and, provided that  >  ,
se > 0. Moreover, since ¶(etEE jht=0)=¶ > 0, the y-intercept corresponding to t =  is larger
than the one deﬁned by t = . Finally, we also have ¶se()=¶ > 0, for  >  . Consequently,
the slope of the ﬁrst portion of the locus EE (given by se()) is smaller than the slope of the
second part (se()), as represented in Figure 6.
C.3 Existence, multiplicity and stability of steady-states
Provided that sh > se and  >  , there exist two points A  (hA,eA) = EE() \ HH() and
B  (hB,eB) = EE() \ HH(), such that 0 < hA < hB and 0 < eA < eB. A and B are both
steady-states if eA +hA < J < eB +hB. Figure 6 provides a straightforward illustration of this
condition: the dashed line et +ht = J should lie between A and B.
Let us now study the stability of A and B. Consider ﬁrst the locus HH, and take a point
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where t =  (= ) for et +ht < J ( J). If sh > se, then the numerator of equation (A.18) is
positive, since se > 0. Consequently, we can verify that, for ht > h (< h), ht < 0 (> 0). Hence,
ht decreases (increases). Similarly, let us now consider a point (h,e) 2 EE. For a ﬁxed ht = h, and
taking (A.19), the dynamics of et are given by the following expression:
et =
(1   )t   f1 + [(1  ) +]tg
1 + [(1  ) +]t
(et   e), (A.22)
where t =  (= ) for et +ht < J ( J). Since the numerator is negative, it is clear that, for
et > e (< e), et < 0 (> 0). Hence, et decreases (increases).
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